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Abstract
We present a simple, elegant model of household saving toward a mortgage loan under
an exogenous down payment requirement and preference for owning over renting. The
model delivers a closed form solution that associates down savings with the intended down
payment as well as the impatience and the utility curvature parameters. It also helps explain
a set of empirical observations such as the dual effect in the form of some households, in
response to higher down payments, becoming discouraged savers while those who do not
abandon purchasing plans save more. In addition, we present a straightforward and empiri-
cally observable way of testing the main implication of our model. Estimation results based
on Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data support the down payment elasticity of
saving of 0.5 implied by the model. Keywords: Down payments, saving, consumption,
PSID. JEL Codes: D1, E2, R2.
1 Introduction
Owning a home is generally considered as not only an excellent ﬁnancial investment, but also
a source of signiﬁcant beneﬁts, both personal and social. Not surprisingly, homeownership is
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verycommonintheUnitedStates. AccordingtotheCensusBureau(2010), thehomeownership
rates for households aged 70 to 74 years was 82.4 percent in 2010. This shows that a majority of
households decide to purchase a home and therefore face the down payment constraint at some
point in their lives. Indeed, besides its desirability, a house is also a particularly big discrete
purchase, which involves for most families consistent saving for a prolonged period of time to
accumulate the down payment required for mortgage ﬁnancing. According to Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA), the average loan-to-value (LtV) ratio in the United States between
2000 and 2010 was 75 percent.1 In many other countries, the LtV ratio is lower and is often
subject to government regulations.
Empirical investigation of the impacts of the down payment constraint on household sav-
ing has been a topic of various earlier studies. In an inﬂuential study, Yoshikawa and Ohtaka
(1989) show that, in Japan, higher land prices induce more households to give up on becoming
homeowners, while increasing the saving rate for those who do not abandon house purchas-
ing plans. Subsequent research namely Engelhardt (1994), Sheiner (1995), and Haurin et al.
(2001) mostly conﬁrm this ﬁnding for Canada and the United States, while Chen et al. (2007)
observe the discouraged saver effect for Taiwan. Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999) investigate the
macroeconomic impact of down payment constraints and show that relaxing the down payment
requirement was crucial to the observed increase in the owner occupancy rate during the hous-
ing boom of the 1980s in the United Kingdom. Using survey data from 14 OECD countries,
Chiuria and Jappelli (2003) show that higher down payment ratios cause postponing of owner
occupancy, especially for young households who are more likely to be credit constrained.
Theoretical studies on down payment saving have been rare, although there exists research
developing various quantitative dynamic equilibrium models of life cycle behavior with a focus
on liquidity constraints including down payments. Some recent examples include Campbell
and Cocco (2003), Yao and Zhang (2005), Luengo-Prado (2006), Li and Yao (2007), Chambers
1The LtV ratios reported by FHFA (2010) is higher for ﬁrst-time home buyers because their data include
existing owners who can roll-over a part of their capital gains from selling their prior home into a down payment
on the next home. The data also do not consider subprime and alternative A mortgages, and therefore miss the fall
in the average down payment during the early and mid-2000s.
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et al. (2009), and Yang (2009). The only theoretical model of down saving that we are aware
of, however, is a basic two-period model by Brueckner (1986).
In a period of increased regulatory restrictions regarding home buyer down payment re-
quirements, we have all the more incentive to understand and explain the impact of this speciﬁc
credit constraint on household saving behavior. In an attempt to offer an original and intuitive
perspective on this issue, we introduce a simple and intuitive model that portrays the trade-off
caused by down payments namely, a higher level of saving today versus an increased utility
associated with homeownership in the future.
In the next section, we introduce the model and discuss its implications. In Section 3 we
explain our data, present the descriptive evidence supporting the model, and discuss our empir-
ical investigation of down payment elasticity of saving of ﬁrst-time home buyers between 1993
and 1995 in the United States. Section 4 offers some conclusions.
2 The Model
If a household decides to enter a long-term ﬁnancial obligation by obtaining a mortgage loan,
this must be because it is advantageous. Indeed, there exists extensive research document-
ing the various social and ﬁnancial beneﬁts of homeownership. Among the various studies,
Hendershott and White (2000) provide a discussion of the tax incentives in the United States
since the 1970s. Haurin et al. (2002) report increased self esteem, a better quality home envi-
ronment, and fewer child behavior problems among homeowning parents. Sinai and Souleles
(2005) show the signiﬁcant rent hedging beneﬁts associated with homeownership. There also
exist studies linking homeownership with better health (Robert and House 1996), success in
the labor market (Fisher and Coulson 2002), improved dwelling quality (Gatzlaff et al. 1998),
better educational outcomes for children (Boehm and Schlottmann 1999), greater participation
in social networks (Rohe and Stegman 1994), and increased political activity (Gilderbloom and
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Markham 1995); to name but a few.2
Based on the studies mentioned above, we start with the assumption that transition from
renting to owning a home generates a ﬂow of utility denoted by u(H), separable from the
utility of consumption
u(C); u
0(C) > 0; u
00(C) < 0: (1)
Here, C represents the consumption on all goods and services including consumption of hous-
ing services out of income Y , which is in turn assumed to be ﬁxed with the expectation that
households recognize the long-run nature of the ownership decision and thus become home-
owners only when their income prospects are stable enough (Coulson and Fisher 2002). A
ﬁxed income is also justiﬁed by the fact that borrowers with income uncertainty can have difﬁ-
culty in accessing the mortgage market (Diaz-Serrano 2005).
We also assume that the target down payment and closing costs for the desired home is
known with certainty and denote it by D. Although extremely low down payments have been
available in countries such as the United States for several decades, D can still be a binding
constraint. It is important to note that there are many forms of liquidity constraints such as
large fees, higher interest rates, set LtV ratios, insurance requirements, and unavailability of
credit due to adverse selection caused by asymmetric information. Given the general rigidness
of housing services consumption,3 one can argue that a required down payment, be it observed
or unobserved, is determined to a large extent by the existing liquidity constraints faced by
household, both explicit and implicit.
The requirement for a large initial payment means that the household has to give up present
consumption and save a part of income for a certain duration of time. Because of the long-term
utility gains, purchase of the home represents a household investment and the household has to
2The homeownership externality literature is extensive and beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed
review, the reader is referred to Rohe et al. (2002), and Dietz and Haurin (2003).
3Yang (2009) shows that, over the life cycle, the consumption proﬁle for housing ﬁrst increases monotonically
and then ﬂattens out in all income levels. Using PSID data between 1980 and 1993, Bajari et al. (2010) observe
that households move only 4.3 percent of the years and less than 25 percent of these is a downgrade to a smaller
home.
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come up with a plan or a saving scheme in order to accumulate the necessary funds in a way that
increases lifetime utility. In particular, the household must choose a rate of consumption C that
will facilitate a rapid purchase of the asset while maintaining the lowest possible deprivation
from present utility [u(Y ) u(C)] due to saving. The projected time of purchase, denoted with
, depends not only on the projected per period absolute amount of savings S = Y   C, but
also on the size of the down payment. We make the assumption that real interest earned on





Figure 1 illustrates the lifetime utility associated with owning a home by ﬁrst saving for a
down payment. The downward sloping utility curve at the top represents the discounted u(Y )+
u(H) stream of utility gained after  with homeownership. Below are the u(Y ) stream of fully
consuming the income, and the alternative u(C) stream of consuming at C < Y with saving.
These curves are discounted at t = 0 as well. Area i is the total dead-weight utility loss of not
being able to acquire the asset immediately due to the existing liquidity constraints embodied
in the form of a down payment. The area labeled ii represents the total utility cost of saving
until , while the area labeled iii is the total utility gain afterward. At time , there is a boost
in the utility level from the combined positive externalities associated with homeownership.4
It is assumed that repayment options after the purchase are ﬂexible and, in particular, monthly
mortgage installments do not have to be higher than the cost of housing services. As long
as area iii is greater than area ii, buying a home yields a higher total lifetime utility than the
alternative of remaining as a renter and getting u(Y ) for life.
If the household lives forever, the total utility gains is an inﬁnite stream of utility starting at
4The one-time jump in utility at time  due to a released borrowing constraint can be observed empirically. In
a study of the liquidity constraints caused by down payments for home purchases, Engelhardt (1996) shows that
households in the United States experience a 10 percent higher growth in real food consumption expenditures after
the periods of home purchases. Due to the fundamental nature and the non-durability of food, this provides strong
evidence for an increase in household consumption in general.
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 and ending at inﬁnity. Using 0 <  < 1 to denote the rate of time preference, the total utility










If the rate of saving is low,  will be long, and the beneﬁts from homeownership will be smaller
due to time discounting. On the other hand, if the saving rate is high,  will be short, and will
result in u(H) gained sooner. Suppressing present consumption with saving, however, comes
at the expense of an increasingly bigger utility loss due to the strictly concave utility function.
Similar to (3), the projected total utility loss due to giving up part of consumption for a
duration of  can be expressed as












Making a cost-beneﬁt analysis, the consumer is assumed to choose the level of consumption
that maximizes the contribution per sacriﬁce in current utility in the standard investment theory
fashion. As a result, by dividing (3) by (4), we obtain the relative utility gain function
g =
u(H)
u(Y )   u(C)
e 
1   e  : (5)
As long as g > 1, utility gains are bigger than the utility cost so that it is advantageous to save
toward a mortgage loan. If g  1, which can happen when u(H) is too small or Y is too low
with respect to D, the household will abandon purchase plans and remain as a renter.
Equation (5) implies that there exists an optimum level of consumption (and thus saving),
which gives the maximum return obtainable from this saving scheme. Using the constraints









0(C) = [u(Y )   u(C)]
0: (6)
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; 0 <  < 1; (7)
which has the curvature parameter  known as the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion.
With CARA preferences, it is possible to ﬁnd max[g] from the optimum rate of consump-


















































Substituting (2) for  and using the fact that 0 = =Y   C, we obtain
(Y   C)
2 =  D: (11)
Finally, the positive root of the above quadratic equation yields
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According to (13), the optimum rate of saving for a required down payment D depends on
the curvature of the utility function  as well as the rate of time preference . Without doubt,
these parameters are inﬂuenced by factors such as age, gender, ﬁnancial wealth, and human
capital; which are known to be explanatory for household saving.
It is important to note that the optimum rate of saving in (13) is worth adopting only if
g > 1. This in turn is determined by the required down payment D as well as the utility
received from homeownership u(H). To illustrate, let us plot (6) with respect to consumption,
which results in a hump-shaped curve with a local maximum between 0 < C < Y . As the
upper part of Figure 2 shows; for the hypothetical case where D = 1000, Y = 100, u(H) =
2.5, and  =  = 0.05; the optimum rate of saving is about 32 percent. This gives a maximum
g of about 1.24, implying a utility gain of 24 percent. When D is increased to 1100, max[g]
falls to 1.03 and the household now has to save at a higher rate of about 33 percent. Further
raising D to 1200 requires an even higher optimum saving rate of 35 percent, however, the
resulting max[g] = 0.86 means that the saving scheme is now disadvantageous and will not be
followed.
The lower partof Figure2 similarlyshows theeffect ofa changein u(H). Forthe D = 1000
case, less utility from homeownership decreases the motivation for saving without affecting the
optimal saving rate. If u(H) is too low (implying a home that is too small or too low quality for
a the required down payment), the household will again decline the unfeasible saving scheme
where max[g]  1.
Table 1 gives the optimum saving percentages associated with different  and D values
for the case  = 0.05 and Y = 100. Only the feasible cases where g > 1 are shown. The
numbers in bold represent the smaller set of feasible cases when u(H) is set at a lower value
(2.5 instead of 7.5). For a given , saving increases with down payment but after a point no
saving becomes optimal. According to the table, the rate of saving also increases with the
rate of time preference. Though it may seem puzzling at ﬁrst, the intuitive explanation of a
higher discount factor causing more savings is straightforward: The relatively more impatient
8Yalta AT. 2011. A Model of Down Payment Saving. Working paper no: 11-01, Department of
Economics, TOBB University of Economics and Technology.
household has to save at a higher rate in order to be able to receive earlier the homeownership
beneﬁts.
There exists empirical evidence supporting the relationship between saving, tenure choice,
and down payments depicted in Figure 2 and Table 1. Using Japanese cross-sectional data,
YoshikawaandOhtaka(1989)studytherelationbetweenlandpricesandthesavingsofprospec-
tive homeowners. They ﬁnd that higher prices result in higher saving rates for those who keep
house purchasing plans, however, higher prices also cause some potential buyers to become
permanent renters. Engelhardt (1994) conﬁrms this “discouraged saver” effect by ﬁnding a
lower propensity to participate in the Canada’s Registered Home Ownership Savings Program
when the house prices were higher. His results show a negative relationship between house
prices and asset accumulation among the participants but they are marginally signiﬁcant. Using
the PSID data, Sheiner (1995) also supports Yoshikawa and Ohtaka by reporting that higher
house prices and the asset accumulation of renters are positively related. Sheiner does not ﬁnd
evidence of a discouraged saver effect, however, as she argues, this can be due to her method
depending on homeownership rates which do not vary much across cities in the United States.
Haurin et al. (2001) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data and ﬁnd that an in-
crease in real constant-quality house prices reduces the probability of ownership in the United
States. Holding the ownership probability constant, they also ﬁnd that an increase in house
prices raises the respondents’ real wealth as well. Chiuria and Jappelli (2003) use micro data
based on about 30,000 individuals from 14 OECD countries and show that higher down pay-
ment ratios oblige young households to postpone homeownersip to later in life, which in turn
affects the distribution of owner occupancy rates across different age groups.
Our model, as all models, has its shortcomings as well. The main limitation of the model
is the absence of an endogenous link between the size of the down payment and the utility
received from homeownership. There exists an indirect mechanism where accepting a higher
D or choosing a lower u(H) both decrease the motivation for saving. Still, the model does not
allow the case where households adjust not only the rate of savings, but also the size of the
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home purchased. In practice, this margin of adjustment may not be very important due to the
high adjustment costs generally associated with the consumption of housing services. Recent
studies namely Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), Yang (2009), and Bajari et al. (2010)
show that the life time proﬁle of housing consumption in all income levels ﬁrst monotonically
increases and then becomes ﬂat toward the end of the life cycle. As a result, it is not unrea-
sonable to think that, with increased credit constraints, the household will prefer to become a
discouraged saver instead of moving into an inferior dwelling, especially when making a long
term decision about homeownership.
3 Empirical Analysis
For a household making tenure choice under the existence of a down payment requirement, the









That is, in view of factors such as the level of income Y and the required down payment
D, the household ﬁrst decides whether or not owning is advantageous. As mentioned earlier,
the discouraged saver effect resulting from g  1 is already well discussed in the literature.
Consequently, we employ an empirical strategy based on focusing on households that reveal a
g > 1 by displaying the explicit decision of actually obtaining a mortgage loan. Using data
on such households, we can test whether down payments are important for explaining saving
behavior in the way implied by our model.
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of the lower part of (14) yields the following
econometric speciﬁcation
ln(Si) = 1 ln(i) + 2 ln(Di) + i; (15)
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Here, i is deﬁned as the unobserved ratio of rate of time preference to absolute risk aversion
for household i. Also, 1 = 2 = 0.5, suggesting that saving is inelastic to  and D. We model
ln(i) as




where X is a k  1 vector of various demographic variables controlling for heterogeneity in
preferences across different households. Substituting (16) into (15) yields the regression speci-
ﬁcation
ln(Si) = 1 + 1
K X
k=1
dkXk;i + 2 ln(Di) + i: (17)
If 2 is positive, then there is evidence that down payments are important in explaining house-
hold saving prior to obtaining a mortgage loan. In addition, we want to test H0 : 2 = 0.5,
which suggests a down payment elasticity of saving of 0.5. This implies that a bigger required
down payment induces a higher rate of saving and a longer time to save at the same time.
Our data is obtained from the PSID, a large scale longitudinal study conducted since 1968
by the Survey Research Center of University of Michigan. The core PSID data and its supple-
ments provide a valuable asset for doing research on a large variety of subject matter. Particu-
larly important for our study is the availability of detailed information regarding the participat-
ing families’ wealth structure and socioeconomic outcomes.5
The PSID does not collect down payment information on a regular basis. In fact, it was
only in 1996 that the core PSID survey included a special “mortgage shopping” section where
the participants, who had a mortgage at that time, were asked on this topic detailed questions
including the amount as well as the source of their down payments. Because the wealth data
useful for studying household saving behavior are only available in ﬁve year intervals before
1996, for the empirical work, we focus on the 1989-1994 savings of households who report in
1996 obtaining a mortgage in either 1993, 1994, or 1995.6
5For more information on the PSID, a good starting point is the “Overview” section at their website located at
http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/.
6The PSID data is collected between March and November, with 1994 being an exception going into Decem-
ber. By including the 1993 and 1995 mortgages, we attempt to increase our sample size. We do not make any
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We construct our sample by ﬁrst selecting those individuals who have remained as the
family head between 1989 and 1996 with no change in marital status. From this group we
omit those observations with missing 1989 or 1994 wealth data, or 1996 mortgage information
data. From a total of 4230 observations meeting the above criteria, we select those who have
saved and obtained an original mortgage between 1993 and 1995, and reported in 1996 the
down payment amount for this loan. This process results in a sample of 222 households, 81 of
which mention sale of a previous home as the down payment source, and are dropped. Out of
the remaining 141 ﬁrst-time home buyers, we also exclude those who have received a gift or
a lump-sum payment of more than 5 percent of their yearly income between 1989 and 1994.7
In this group, we observe that those who have mentioned “family and friends” and “other” as
the primary down payment source are 8.3 percent and 7.5 percent respectively. This conﬁrms
Engelhardt (1996), who discuss that on average 8.6 percent of ﬁrst-time home buyers ﬁnance
their down payments mostly or entirely from relatives. Our ﬁnal regression sample includes
those ﬁrst-time home buyers who have reported savings as their primary source of the down
payment. This consists of 101 individuals and comprises 45 percent of all original loans in the
sample period.
The data on savings comes from the “PSID Family Wealth Supplements” funded by the
National Institute on Aging. This unique data set provides detailed information on the respon-
dents’ ﬁnancial positions and makes it possible to track changes in different components of
family wealth. We measure 1989-1994 total household saving as the change in all components
of family wealth, deﬂated using the all-items CPI.8 Using head and wife’s total taxable income,
we calculate the median saving rate for our sample as 13.7 percent. This is almost twice as high
as the 7.0 percent found for households who did not have a mortgage in the 1989-1994 period,
corrections to the savings of these two groups because, although the interview dates are available in terms of days
and months, the date the mortgage obtained is available only as the year. The random errors due to over calculating
or under calculating the 5 year savings should not introduce a systematic bias to our estimates because the sizes of
the 1993, 1994, and 1995 groups in our sample are approximately the same.
7The estimation results were not sensitive to this omission.
8The CPI values that we use are the national ﬁgures. We do not attempt to control for prices across different
cities or regions in the United States.
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and shows once again how down payments can be an important source of household saving.
The p-value of .0012 for the Wald test for the equality of the two median saving rates indicates
that higher saving by the purchase observations is statistically signiﬁcant.
The down payment data is obtained from the “mortgage shopping” sequence of the 1996
survey and is also deﬂated based on the year of the loan and by using all-items CPI. Using the
house value reported in 1996, we calculate the LtV ratio for our sample as 85. percent. Not
surprisingly, this is slightly higher than the 1994 and 1995 national averages of 79.9 percent
reported by FHFA (2010), whose data includes repeat home buyers with lower LtVs in general.
The vector of variables used for explaining the  parameter representing the ratio of rate
of time preference to risk aversion consist of dummy variables for whether or not the head
was male, was married, was white, was college educated, whether a ﬁxed-rate mortgage was
obtained, whether the head was salaried on the main job, and whether he reported his health
status as “excellent” as opposed to the alternatives including “very good.” In addition, we
include as regressors the age of the head and the size of the family unit. These variables are as
of 1989 and are as given by the PSID except two missing observations for the “head is white”
dummy, which are assigned the sample median value of 1.
In order to control for income, we use PSID’s “total taxable income of head and wife”
deﬁnition, which is also deﬂated using the all-items CPI. Our “total taxable income” variable is
obtained by summing up the individual values between 1990 and 1994. It is important to note
that the yearly income values remain mostly stable in the sample. The Wald test statistic for the
null hypothesis of simultaneous equality of income means for the ﬁve years is not rejected with
a p-value of .25. This provides additional support for our initial assumption of ﬁxed income
during down payment saving.
In the United States, the down payment constraint for the ﬁrst-time home buyer entails
choosing between either a conventional mortgage, or a government insured mortgage such as
a Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or a Veterans Administration (VA) loan. The latter,
which guarantees lenders against losses, involves less stringent credit standards and requires a
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signiﬁcantly lower down payment in comparison to conventional mortgages. Consequently, we
control this factor by also adding a dummy variable for FHA/VA and other government insured
loans.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics on the primary variables of interest. The average
values of the various variables including income, down payment size, and the house value are
comparable to those reported in Engelhardt (1994), Sheiner (1995), and Mayer and Engelhardt
(1996).
The OLS estimation of (17) based on heteroscedasticity-robust HC3 standard errors (White
1980) is presented in the ﬁrst column of Table 3.9 The dependent variable is the natural log-
arithm of 1989-1994 savings. The explanatory variables are the log of down payment, the
log of total taxable income, the set of regressors controlling for heterogeneity in household
preferences, and the dummy variable for government insured mortgages. Also included in the
speciﬁcation, but not included in the table, are dummies for the year of the loan, census region,
and whether located in a metropolitan area. The results show that, in addition to taxable in-
come, the marriage dummy and the family unit size are important for explaining total savings.
The effects of the other variables are not signiﬁcant. The estimated coefﬁcient on the log of
down payment is not signiﬁcant and H0 : 2 = 0.5 is rejected at the 5 percent level.
Because saving and down payments are endogenous, ordinary least squares estimation can
be both biased and inconsistent pointing out the need for an instrumental variables approach.
Although it is not always easy to ﬁnd good instruments, the comprehensive nature of the PSID
presents some useful options such as the wealth level employed by Zeldes (1989) for identify-
ing constrained versus unconstrained households. Indeed, the initial 1989 family wealth level,
our ﬁrst instrument, is not an outcome of the subsequent saving for a down payment and there-
fore remains plausibly uncorrelated with the error term. Our second instrument is the number
of rooms in the previous dwelling, which is explanatory for the size and the required down
payment for the desired home. Although this also represents a form of consumption, it is still a
9Gretl 1.9.0 was used. A gretl session ﬁle containing the data and the model estimations is available upon
request from the author.
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good potential instrument not mechanically related to saving due to the high adjustment costs
generally associated with the consumption of housing services. As a third instrument, we use
the value of the purchased home, which is directly related with the down payment while re-
maining uncorrelated with some of the omitted determinants of saving that make up the error
term. In our sample, this is seen from the considerably higher correlation coefﬁcient with the
down payment in comparison to that with saving (.77 versus .58).
The two stage least squares (TSLS) results are presented in the second column of Table 3.
Despite the loss of efﬁciency, the coefﬁcient on the log of down payment is now statistically
different from both 0 and 1 at the 1 percent level. In fact, the hypothesis H0 : 2 = 0.5 is not
rejected with a p-value of .73. In addition, the Hausman test of the null that OLS estimates are
consistent is rejected (p-value = .012), and the Sargan over-identiﬁcation test of the null that
all the instruments are valid is not rejected (p-value = .36).
Because weak instruments are a potential source of serious problems in IV estimation, we
test the strength of our instruments by comparing the ﬁrst-stage F-statistic with the critical
values based on the Monte Carlo analysis of Stock and Yogo (2003). The ﬁrst-stage F of
15.08 shows that hypothesis tests based on the model’s standard errors that nominally use the
5 percent signiﬁcance level may reject the null with a probability greater than 10 percent. This
size distortion cannot reverse the test results regarding the 2 estimate discussed above. Still,
we present in the third column the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation
results, which can be relatively less affected by weak instruments and therefore considered
more robust in comparison to TSLS. Indeed, the weak instruments test result for LIML shows
a maximal size of less than 10 percent, while the coefﬁcient estimates remain almost identical.
Our baseline results are presented in the fourth column and are obtained using an iterated
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The GMM criterion is Q = .0202 and the
p-value of Hansen’s J statistic for the null hypothesis of correct speciﬁcation is found as .565.
While the coefﬁcient estimates are comparable to the former TSLS and LIML estimations, the
improved efﬁciency of GMM gives marriage and college education dummies that are signif-
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icant at the 10 percent level. The results show that married households and households with
higher incomes save more, while college education and the number of children affect saving
negatively. These ﬁndings are not inconsistent with the expectations. The null that 2 = 0.5 is
not rejected with a p-value of .91.
The TSLS, LIML, and GMM estimations all do not reject the proposition of our model
that a one percent increase in the size of the down payment causes a 0.5 percent increase in
savings among purchasing households. The empirical results are robust in several dimensions.
First, the Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) estimator of the median, which is more robust to
outliers, produces results almost identical to OLS. Second, as can be seen in Table 4, our
ﬁndings are not sensitive to trimming off 2.5 percent of the observations from each tail of
the sample to eliminate the inﬂuence of outliers. Third, we again obtain the similar results
shown in Table 5 and Table 6, which consider conventional mortgages and government insured
mortgages separately. Although the down payment elasticities are found lower for government
insured loans, the larger standard errors and the potentially biased estimates (the ﬁrst-stage F
of 1.81 implies a more than 30 percent relative bias) due to the much smaller sample prevent
reaching a conclusion. Last but not least, we also employ the two direct estimations of risk
aversion contained in the 1996 wave of the PSID (Barsky et al. 1997). When included in the
speciﬁcation, these risk aversion measures remain insigniﬁcant and do not alter the results.
Some caution should be taken with the estimation results for several reasons. First, due to
the unavailability of data regarding the month of the mortgage loan, there can be several months
of over or under calculation of the 5 year total savings. Thanks to the roughly equal size of the
1993, 1994, and 1995 groups; the net error should be small but can still have an impact on the
estimations. Second, our data requires the implicit assumption of a saving duration of 5 years or
more. For 1991, the Chicago Title and Trust Corporation survey data discussed by Engelhardt
(1996) indicate an average time to save of 2 to 5 years in 18 U.S. cities. Given the importance
of gifts in down payment saving (Mayer and Engelhardt 1996), this assumption may not be
implausible for our sample entirely consisting of ﬁrst-time home buyers who ﬁnanced their
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down payments with self savings and without lump-sum payments such as inheritance or help
from familyand friends. Third, our sample cannotinclude households thatsaved for a mortgage
and were denied due to unobservably poor credit, which in turn could bias the estimate of 2.
Finally, if the decision to rely on gifts is endogenous such that some households turn to family
and friends when savings is below some threshold, this can result in a sample with inﬂated
savings.
4 Conclusion
Homeownership is an important motive behind household saving. The fact that the mechanism
through which this is accomplished can have important repercussions in the macroeconomy
points out the usefulness of understanding the speciﬁc impacts of down payments on household
saving. Our intention in this study is to tackle this challenge by following the classical spirit
of offering intuition into a particular problem by building a small, stylized model of a special
case of that problem. As a result, we adopt a novel approach and propose a unique model for
analyzing a household’s decision of whether to rent or own a home and, if a household is going
to own, at what rate to save in order to accumulate a required down payment.
According to our model, households try to manage the impact of higher down payments
with partially higher saving rates and a longer saving duration simultaneously. If the required
adjustment is too costly in terms of utility, they can give up on purchase plans as well. The
model takes into account the various positive externalities associated with homeownership in
the literature (Rohe et al. 2002; Dietz and Haurin 2003). Moreover, it captures a set of em-
pirical observations such as the dual effect in the form of some households becoming discour-
aged savers while those who do not abandon purchasing plans save more in response to higher
down payments (Yoshikawa and Ohtaka 1989; Haurin et al. 2001), as well as the increased
non-housing consumption growth after home purchases (Engelhardt 1996). The model is also
consistent with the observation that higher down payment ratios result in postponed owner oc-
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cupation, especially among young households who are more likely to be credit constrained
(Ortalo-Magne and Rady 1999; Chiuria and Jappelli 2003).
Our model delivers an elegant formula for downsavings (the square root of the intended
down payment multiplied by the ratio of impatience and utility curvature parameters), and
speciﬁcally suggests a down payment elasticity of saving of 0.5. Consequently, in the second
part of this paper, we propose a straightforward and empirically observable way of testing this
hypothesis by focusing on ﬁrst-time home buyers in the United States. Using different instru-
mental variables techniques and the data from the PSID, we ﬁnd striking empirical evidence
supporting the relationship between down payment and savings predicted by the model. As
a result, it is our understanding that the presented model can be helpful to explain the down
payment saving behavior and be used in applications of life cycle savings models, especially
when income and house prices are relatively stable.
Of course, the intuitiveness of the model results from its abstractions. The assumption of
ﬁrst-time home buyers with ﬁxed incomes saving for a preplanned down payment under an
exogenous preference for owning may ﬁrst sound unfamiliar, however, this speciﬁc focus can
be justiﬁed. First and foremost, the need to plan over a long horizon, by its nature, requires a
relative lack of uncertainty. This is also supported by the data, in which the savers display a rel-
atively stable family income during the 5 years prior to obtaining a mortgage loan. Second, an
exogenous down payment requirement can be defended because the amount is to a large extent
determined by a multitude of outside factors, both explicit and implicit. After all, in a perfect
economy, the household will always choose a zero down payment. Third, an exogenous prefer-
ence for owning over renting is not implausible given the extensive homeownership externality
literature. Finally, it is important to mention that our speciﬁc class of savers are not marginal.
In fact, they comprise in the PSID data 45 percent of all who have obtained an original loan in
the sample period.
In the future, the model can serve as a basis for analyzing the discouraged and the induced
saver effects, and assessing the importance of the net effect on national savings as well as cross-
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country differences in saving ratios. It can also be used to develop techniques for estimating
risk aversion. Focusing on the dead-weight utility cost of down payments (area i in Figure 1)
seems worth pursuing as well. Finally, the model can be useful for studying household saving
toward other discrete purchases, especially in countries with bigger borrowing constraints.
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Figure 1: The consumer has to decide the optimum level of saving (Y  C) so that the asset purchased
at  yields the largest future gain with respect to the earlier deprivation from consumption.
Table 1: Hypothetical Optimum Saving Rates for Different Down Payments and 
Down Payment
 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
0.01 10 14 17 20 22 24
0.02 14 20 24 28 32 35
0.03 17 24 30 35 39 42
0.04 20 28 35 40
0.05 22 32 39





Note: Using  = 0:05, Y = 100. Only the viable cases where g(:) > 1 are shown. Values in bold
represent the smaller set of viable cases when u(H) is set at a lower value (2.5 instead of 7.5).
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Figure 2: The optimum rate of saving that maximizes total utility gains as a proportion of the total
utility cost. Hypothetical case using CARA preferences with  =  = 0:05 and Y = 100.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
Total Saving 113.843 286.366 37.849 0.242 2337.560
Down Payment 26.467 43.079 8.000 0.486 213.928
5 Year Total Taxable Income 264.638 183.926 213.070 34.845 1060.120
Age of Head 33.515 9.610 31.000 20.000 69.000
If Head Is Male 0.832 0.376 1.000 0.000 1.000
If Head Is Married 0.723 0.450 1.000 0.000 1.000
If Head Is White 0.723 0.450 1.000 0.000 1.000
If Head Has College Degree 0.426 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000
Family Unit Size 2.792 1.329 3.000 1.000 6.000
If Head Was Salaried 0.485 0.502 0.000 0.000 1.000
If Head’s Health “Excellent” 0.347 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000
If Fixed-rate Mortgage 0.792 0.408 1.000 0.000 1.000
If Government Insured Loan 0.347 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000
1989 Wealth Level 53.201 99.301 11.592  17.567 450.873
Number of Rooms Before 5.188 1.770 5.000 1.000 10.000
Value of House Purchased 130.724 99.245 101.072 13.224 613.990
Note: All monetary values are in thousands of 1994 dollars.
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Table 3: Estimation Results for the Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Savings
(OLS) (TSLS)1 (LIML)1 (GMM)1
Constant  2:630  1:603  1:543  0:951
(3.894) (3.514) (3.535) (2.601)
Log of Down Payment 0:211 0:577 0:598 0:484
(0.129) (0.220) (0.225) (0.138)
Log of Total 0:949 0:581 0:560 0:594
Taxable Income (0.351) (0.362) (0.367) (0.253)
Age of Head 0:020 0:015 0:014 0:018
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009)
If Head Is Male 0:087 0:132 0:134 0:214
(0.471) (0.494) (0.497) (0.378)
If Head Is Married 0:910 0:949 0:952 0:976
(0.439) (0.534) (0.537) (0.326)
If Head Is White  0:076  0:184  0:190  0:133
(0.340) (0.334) (0.336) (0.268)
If Head Has College  0:205  0:339  0:346  0:276
Degree (0.342) (0.327) (0.329) (0.272)
Family Unit Size  0:413  0:405  0:405  0:433
(0.164) (0.147) (0.148) (0.123)
If Head is Salaried  0:262  0:198  0:194  0:267
(0.362) (0.307) (0.309) (0.299)
If Head’s Health  0:125  0:236  0:242  0:295
Is “Excellent” (0.303) (0.294) (0.296) (0.235)
If Fixed-rate Mortgage 0:246 0:258 0:259 0:258
(0.325) (0.329) (0.331) (0.265)
If Government Insured  0:232 0:087 0:105 0:013
Mortgage (0.327) (0.344) (0.348) (0.274)
n 101 101 101 101
R2 0:50 0:462 0:462 0:472
`  151:671  536:787
Q 0:0103
1 Instrumented for log of down payment.
2 Pseudo R2 computed as the square of the correlation between Y and ^ Y .
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level. ** and
* idem, 5% and 10%. Also included in the speciﬁcation but not included in the table are
dummies for the purchase year, census region, and whether located in a metropolitan area.
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Table 4: Estimation Results for the Trimmed Sample
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Savings
(OLS) (TSLS)1 (LIML)1 (GMM)1
Constant 1:728 2:411 2:453 2:298
(2.494) (2.706) (2.720) (2.113)
Log of Down Payment 0:273 0:504 0:519 0:489
(0.097) (0.163) (0.167) (0.118)
Log of Total 0:545 0:315 0:301 0:313
Taxable Income (0.195) (0.274) (0.277) (0.208)
Age of Head 0:027 0:023 0:023 0:026
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
If Head Is Male  0:231  0:227  0:227  0:130
(0.385) (0.376) (0.378) (0.291)
If Head Is Married 0:774 0:786 0:786 0:756
(0.348) (0.402) (0.404) (0.279)
If Head Is White  0:187  0:289  0:296  0:279
(0.265) (0.265) (0.267) (0.219)
If Head Has College  0:102  0:197  0:202  0:105
Degree (0.310) (0.256) (0.257) (0.256)
Family Unit Size  0:324  0:315  0:314  0:317
(0.140) (0.115) (0.115) (0.101)
If Head is Salaried  0:099  0:029  0:025  0:088
(0.285) (0.242) (0.243) (0.244)
If Head’s Health  0:261  0:349  0:355  0:290
Is “Excellent” (0.230) (0.229) (0.230) (0.186)
If Fixed-rate Mortgage 0:156 0:162 0:162 0:248
(0.289) (0.247) (0.248) (0.223)
If Government Insured  0:184 0:013 0:025 0:009
Mortgage (0.248) (0.261) (0.263) (0.226)
n 95 95 95 95
R2 0:55 0:522 0:522 0:532
`  115:163  471:155
Q 0:0282
1 Instrumented for log of down payment.
2 Pseudo R2 computed as the square of the correlation between Y and ^ Y .
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level. ** and
* idem, 5% and 10%. Also included in the speciﬁcation but not included in the table are
dummies for the purchase year, census region, and whether located in a metropolitan area.
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Table 5: Estimation Results for Conventional Mortgages Only
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Savings
(OLS) (TSLS)1 (LIML)1 (GMM)1
Constant  1:910  1:259  1:159  0:105
(3.924) (3.794) (3.828) (2.486)
Log of Down Payment 0:353 0:555 0:586 0:487
(0.148) (0.223) (0.235) (0.145)
Log of Total 0:858 0:662 0:632 0:623
Taxable Income (0.349) (0.371) (0.380) (0.249)
Age of Head 0:019 0:015 0:014 0:021
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
If Head Is Male  0:052  0:083  0:088 0:002
(0.664) (0.557) (0.561) (0.440)
If Head Is Married 0:819 0:813 0:813 0:890
(0.635) (0.571) (0.575) (0.383)
If Head Is White  0:229  0:264  0:270  0:299
(0.457) (0.384) (0.387) (0.262)
If Head Has College  0:315  0:462  0:485  0:385
Degree (0.441) (0.401) (0.407) (0.278)
Family Unit Size  0:438  0:443  0:443  0:481
(0.185) (0.157) (0.158) (0.129)
If Head is Salaried 0:005 0:056 0:064 0:025
(0.412) (0.377) (0.380) (0.287)
If Head’s Health  0:695  0:768  0:779  0:898
Is “Excellent” (0.370) (0.333) (0.337) (0.248)
If Fixed-rate Mortgage 0:102 0:057 0:050  0:007
(0.380) (0.362) (0.365) (0.263)
n 66 66 66 66
R2 0:65 0:642 0:642 0:642
`  88:846  313:997
Q 0:0172
1 Instrumented for log of down payment.
2 Pseudo R2 computed as the square of the correlation between Y and ^ Y .
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level. ** and
* idem, 5% and 10%. Also included in the speciﬁcation but not included in the table are
dummies for the purchase year, census region, and whether located in a metropolitan area.
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Table 6: Estimation Results for Government Insured Loans Only
Dependent Variable: Log of Total Savings
(OLS) (TSLS)1 (LIML)1 (GMM)1
Constant  5:341 1:280 2:243  7:526
(17.111) (14.664) (15.233) (7.112)
Log of Down Payment  0:246 0:272 0:347 0:153
(0.519) (0.695) (0.745) (0.380)
Log of Total 1:427 0:396 0:246 1:230
Taxable Income (1.721) (1.734) (1.826) (0.890)
Age of Head 0:019 0:024 0:025 0:020
(0.048) (0.030) (0.031) (0.026)
If Head Is Male 0:179 0:198 0:201 0:500
(1.730) (1.104) (1.125) (0.843)
If Head Is Married  0:110 0:561 0:659  0:142
(2.325) (1.843) (1.902) (1.069)
If Head Is White 0:804 0:988 1:015 0:849
(1.383) (1.011) (1.033) (0.552)
If Head Has College  0:152 0:187 0:236  0:016
Degree (0.835) (0.839) (0.868) (0.349)
Family Unit Size  0:395  0:349  0:343  0:302
(0.644) (0.371) (0.379) (0.312)
If Head is Salaried  1:398  1:239  1:216  1:381
(1.021) (0.668) (0.685) (0.476)
If Head’s Health 0:673 0:570 0:555 0:642
Is “Excellent” (0.793) (0.631) (0.645) (0.351)
If Fixed-rate Mortgage 0:067 0:301 0:335 0:462
(1.387) (0.821) (0.843) (0.632)
n 35 35 35 35
R2 0:62 0:572 0:562 0:572
`  44:352  128:129
Q 0:0578
1 Instrumented for log of down payment.
2 Pseudo R2 computed as the square of the correlation between Y and ^ Y .
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level. ** and
* idem, 5% and 10%. Also included in the speciﬁcation but not included in the table are
dummies for the purchase year, census region, and whether located in a metropolitan area.
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